On January 14, 2025, the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces confirmed a large-scale strike against Russian military targets deep within its territory, including oil storage bases and military production facilities located 200–1,100 kilometers from the frontlines. Despite limitations in the destructive power of Ukraine’s existing long-range attack drones due to payload constraints, their systematic deployment since 2024—combined with U.S.-supplied weaponry—has inflicted measurable damage on critical Russian rear-area installations. The operational use of massed long-range drones and the defensive vulnerabilities exposed during these attacks warrant close attention from military strategists.
I. Ukrainian Attack Details
Between late January 13 and early January 14, 2025, Ukrainian forces conducted coordinated drone strikes against targets in Russia’s Bryansk, Saratov, Tula regions, and the Republic of Tatarstan. The following table summarizes the attacks from January 13–16:
| Date/Time | Target | Damage Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Jan 13 (Night) – Jan 14 | Alekseevsky Chemical Plant (Tula Oblast) | Fire caused by Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) drones |
| Engels Airbase (Saratov Oblast) | Sustained blaze at ammunition depot storing glide bombs and cruise missiles | |
| Saratov Oil Refinery | Major infrastructure fire post-strike | |
| Bryansk Chemical Plant | Direct missile hit triggered explosions (produces rocket fuel/ammunitions for Russian military) | |
| Jan 16 | Kuzmino-Gat Gunpowder Factory (Tambov Oblast) | Damage unconfirmed (located ~450 km east of Russia-Ukraine border) |
| Voronezh Oil Depot | Fire ignited by drone payload |
Key Observations:
- Ukraine intensified systematic attacks on military-industrial facilities supporting Russia’s war effort, notably through repeated strikes on the Kristall oil storage facility in Saratov.
- The January 13 strikes in southwestern Russia destroyed two air defense systems (Tor and Buk) and ignited fires at the Bryansk Chemical Plant, a critical rocket fuel production site.
- While individual drone payloads limited single-strike lethality, cumulative damage from sustained attacks risks degrading logistical capabilities and forcing resource reallocation for rear-area defense.
II. Analysis of Ukrainian Long-Range Drone Deployment
(1) Probable Drone Models
Though unconfirmed, Ukraine likely utilized the following drones with ~50 kg payloads and extended ranges:
Liutyi Drone
- Range: 1,000 km
- Cost: ~$200,000 per unit
- Features:
- Aerodynamic design resembling Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 (low fuel consumption)
- Lightweight fiberglass airframe
- Hybrid guidance system (autonomous and manual modes)
- Modular assembly for rapid deployment
UJ-22/UJ-26 Drones (UkrJet)
- Range: 800 km
- Capabilities:
- Winged design for extended loitering
- Precision strikes on static targets
Liutyi UAV with modular warhead design
(2) Tactical Employment
A. Swarm Attacks
- Mechanics: 10–15 Liutyi drones assault a single target sequentially or simultaneously.
- Warhead Effectiveness: Blade-fragment payloads (shown below) enhance structural damage through forced fragmentation.
Liutyi Warhead recovered by Russian forces
B. Decoy Coordination
- Tactic: Use drones to saturate Russian air defenses, followed by ATACMS missile strikes on high-value targets.
III. Lessons for Drone Warfare & Defense
(1) Offensive Takeaways
- Integrated Tactics: Combine drone swarms with NATO-supplied missiles to exploit gaps in limited air defense coverage.
- Timing: Night/dawn attacks complicate detection and interception.
(2) Defensive Vulnerabilities
- Inadequate Reconnaissance:
- Russia’s optical/SAR satellites lack coverage and resolution parity with Western systems.
- Resource Constraints:
- Advanced detection systems are prioritized for frontline use, leaving rear areas exposed.
Recommendations:
- Enhance 24/7 surveillance networks and electronic warfare capabilities.
- Study adversarial drone production scales, deployment patterns, and countermeasure strategies.
